The Southern African region faces a number of existent and potential threats to stability that will present challenges to AFRICOM and United States policy. Nation-state instability, violent urban crime, crushing poverty, unemployment, and high HIV/AIDS levels are some of the most significant. While terrorism is not yet a significant issue in Southern Africa, the region has a large Muslim population and is also host to a number of armed non-state actors.
This project examines the barriers to United States-South African strategic cooperation in the context of both nations' interests and the existing and emerging threats. Potential strategies for effective strategic cooperation are examined and recommendations are presented for both AFRICOM and the United States in engaging South Africa as a strategic partner in pursuit of vital national interests.
The Reaction to AFRICOM
The sharp public response from many African newspapers, scholars, and politicians to the creation of AFRICOM underscores the challenges that the command faces. In strategic communications and messaging, the command was preempted before it could develop an effective public relations and strategic communications strategy. In fact much of the negative response came out before AFRICOM was even officially formed. and competition in Africa, and the potential for regional instability due to negative social, economic, and political factors. United States resourcing of its overall African engagement strategy will probably remain relatively low compared to other American global efforts. AFRICOM will have to closely integrate other interagency efforts and fully leverage key African partners to effectively address these challenges.
In the war on terror, the United States is challenged in developing a strategy for the region. Much of the focus in Africa has been in the Horn of Africa. Southern Africa, though, is facing an increasing threat. The South African Minister of Intelligence, Ronnie Kasrils, has warned of possible al-Qaeda sleeper cells in the country. 21 Analyst Kurt
Shillinger points out that in South Africa, key factors of state weakness, years of oppression and "a large, politically active Muslim population… create opportunities for radicalization." 22 There has also been a proliferation of foreign funded Islamic radio stations carrying the al-Qaeda message. 23 South Africa also could be attractive to terrorist cells because of its excellent communications and transportation networks. 24 South Africa has experienced various degrees of domestic terrorism that could affect national stability. In 2002, the white supremacist Boermag carried out a terrorist bombing campaign before it was eliminated by the authorities. 25 And the Muslim vigilante group People Against Gangsterism and Drugs (PAGD) has carried out a violent campaign against criminals elements in the Western Cape. PAGD attacks have recently spread to civilian and police targets as well. 26 Currently, no African nation possesses nuclear weapons, though that has not always been the case. On 24 March 1993, South African President F.W. de Klerk admitted that South Africa had possessed a small nuclear arsenal and announced that the weapons had been destroyed and the program dismantled. 27 Though South Africa is now a committed participant in the non-proliferation treaty, the region faces a number of challenges in controlling the spread of nuclear technology and materials. The region is a source of uranium with the Democratic Republic of Congo, Namibia, Zambia, and South
Africa exporting the mineral. 28 There have been allegations of uranium smuggling onto the black market by elements associated with criminal organization in South Africa. 29 After the fall of Apartheid, the United States was concerned that some weapons grade materials and components remained in South Africa's possession. This was coupled with the African National Congress' close relations with Iran, Libya, and North Korea. 30 Now, South Africa is planning to enter the commercial nuclear sector to increase electrical generation capacity and will soon resume uranium enrichment. Recently, break-in attempts at South Africa's Pelindaba nuclear facility was foiled by security, but not before criminal elements were able to enter the facilities' main control room. 31 Chinese influence and power is a significant challenge for American interests and policies throughout Africa. Researcher Donovan Chu argues that China is engaging in political warfare for influence and power in Africa, using the diplomatic, economic, and information elements of power in a coordinated effort to further Chinese national interests. 32 The central aim of the PRC's grand strategy is to become a global power, restructuring the world order-including the African continent-to achieve this objective.
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Chinese efforts in Africa date back to the cold war when China supported the African liberation movements to include those in the Southern African region. 34 Since 2000, the Chinese have focused their efforts on African states, including South Africa, identified as "anchor states" in United States national security policy. 35 Chinese President Jain The most significant challenge to United States interests in Africa comes from potential regional instability. In the 1990's, some experts maintained that many countries in Sub-Saharan Africa were close to total economic and political collapse.
Overall, genocidal civil war, famine, and infrastructure collapse were widespread. were conceived as the cornerstones of full African economic union to be achieved by the year 2025. 44 In an ideal progression, economic union at the regional and continental level would facilitate eventual political union. From a military perspective, the African Union seeks to create an African stand-by force for peacekeeping and stability operations. Each of the five major regional economic organizations, to include SADC, has the charter to provide a ready brigade for the force. 45 Despite grand vision and some degree of regional economic cooperation, the process of integration faces tremendous challenges. Tariff revenues are still a major source of income for many African governments. Most African governments are not eager to give up any degree of sovereignty or to surrender national interests to the regional organizations. 46 In the case of Southern Africa, there is also the reality of gross inequality in benefits for regional integration. This is due largely to the economic, political, and military superiority of South Africa.
South Africa as a Regional Power
South Africa has variously been described as a regional superpower, 47 Africa's total imports and exports in dollar amount exceeded the combined total of all other SADC members combined by almost a factor of two. 51 South Africa has 50% of the regions paved roads 52 and produces 50% of the regions electricity. 53 Yet South Africa has less than 25% of the population of the region. Terror and campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan. 61 These new realities help drive the second trend, "Africa's new experiments in collective security." 62 The key component of the African collective security effort is the creation of an African Union military standby force. 63 Built around five regional brigades, the force is to achieve full rapid response capability by the year 2010. 64 However, there are huge challenges to the concept. Only the ECOWAS and SADC brigades have even minimal capability 65 and the force is completely lacking in strategic and operational lift and logistics capacity. 66 A significant portion of the SADC Brigade will be provided by South Africa to include the brigade headquarters, a parachute battalion, a motorized battalion, an artillery battalion and other supporting branches to include the base hospital in Pretoria. 67 As well as the force commitment to the SADC brigade, South Africa has deployed forces in support of numerous peacekeeping operations to the extent that signs of overcommitment are evident. 68 The challenges faced by the South African National Defense and procurement project aiming to restore expeditionary capability to the South African National Defense Force. 71 However, given the conditions of underdevelopment, poverty, and unemployment afflicting much of the population, there remains significant domestic political opposition to increased defense spending within South Africa. 72 With the evident "reemergence of the military instrument in South Africa's foreign policy" the conflict between security demands and budget constraints is significant.
73
The Challenges of Strategic Cooperation -United States and South Africa
With the enduring and emerging challenges to American interests in Africa and given the critical regional role of South Africa, effective strategic partnership with South Africa could be an important element of United States African policy. However, historical legacies, and current policies and politics within both countries present significant barriers to effective strategic partnership. From AFRICOM's perspective many of these factors degrade the ability to engage with the SANDF and degrade the ability to build regional defense and security capacity.
In a 1993, a year prior to his election to the presidency, Nelson Mandela presented key principles for South Africa's future foreign policy. 74 Mandela envisioned South Africa moving away from its status as an international pariah and joining the global community as a champion of human dignity and diversity. He recognized the critical importance of the United Nations and identified a fundamental imbalance in the world order prejudicial to the interests of the developing world. Though often sharing common interests with the United States, South Africa's commitment to championing the interests of developing nations and global rebalancing, often put the two nations on fundamentally opposing foreign policy courses.
The impact of United States policies in Southern Africa during the Cold War and during the period of apartheid has a legacy that is difficult to overcome. The current generation of South African politicians understands that the United States supported the minority white regime for Cold War expediencies. 75 In contrast, the "Communist block "
and Third World non-aligned nations, working through the United Nations and on the battlefield, directly supported the South African liberation movements. It is telling that Castro, Qahdaffi, and Arafat were prominent guests at Mandela's inauguration. 76 This historical legacy strongly carries over into current South African foreign policy.
South Africa's membership in the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) serves as the foundation of its foreign policy and drives its aggressive agenda in the United Nations. 77 South Africa is seeking to rebalance the United Nations away from the developed Western world and more to the favor of the developing world. 78 And, South Africa retains strong bilateral ties with Cuba, Libya, North Korea, Iran, and the Palestinian movements.
South Africa has recently assumed a non-permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council and has used that seat in attempts to block what it views as United
States and Western powers attempts to strong-arm smaller developing nations. 79 South
Africa has strongly supported Security Council reform that proposes adding additional permanent Security Council seats (with full veto) for developing nations, to include at least two for the African Union. 80 South Africa has recently taken stands on key issues in direct challenge to United States policy. South Africa voted against condemning Myanmar for human rights violations in January 2007. 81 And South Africa opposes United States sanctions on Iran related to Iran's nuclear program. 82 South Africa supports the right of Iran and other developing nations to develop commercial nuclear energy sources. 83 It is not incidental that South Africa is itself moving ahead with commercial nuclear energy and also gets 40% of its oil from Iran. 84 Under the leadership of Vice-President Gore and Thabo Mbeki, the Bi-National
Commission was established in 1995 to strengthen bilateral ties. 85 The Bush Administration's approach to foreign policy has not enjoyed much support from South
Africa. Disagreement over a number of foreign policy issues resulted in Washington formally ending the Bi-National Commission. 86 89 Mistrust of American intentions in this regard fueled much of the criticism in the African press over the initiation of AFRICOM. Many African's believe that focus on international terrorism pulls world attention and resources away from Africa's real problems; poverty, crime, AIDS, and regional political instability.
Terrorism is not viewed as a fundamental threat to the interests of South Africa. 
